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Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions 
KEVIN C. KENNEDY· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
International sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards have taken center stage at 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), in both the standard-setting and dispute settle-
ment arenas. For example, the labeling, safety, and environmental impacts of geneti-
cally modified organisms (GMOs) are becoming among the most contentious trade is-
sues of 2000.
' 
Do GMOs threaten human health or life? Do they threaten animal health 
or life? If science is inconclusive on either of these scores, should an importing country 
be permitted to ban their entry? Even if science shows that GMOs are safe, should an 
importing country be permitted to require labeling of products that contain GMOs so 
that consumers can decide whether or not to purchase such products? In the absence of 
scientific support indicating that GMOs pose a health risk, would such a labeling re-
quirement be an impermissible restriction on trade because it would be the equivalent of 
a "Warning: This Product May Be Hazardous to Your Health" sticker? 
What answers, if any, do the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement),2 and the WTO jurisprudence interpreting 
it, give to these questions? Before turning to these specific questions and a review of 
three WTO SPS decisions, an overview of some core General Agreement on Tariff 
and Trade (GATT)-WTO provisions is discussed. 
II. GATT 
GATT strives for equal treatment of imported goods, regardless of their source of 
origin, through a nondiscrimination principle that operates on two levels: 1) nondis-
• Mr. Kennedy is a Professor of Law at Michigan State University, Detroit College of Law. 
I See. e.g., Toshio Aritake, Japan Issues Manual for U.S .. Canada on Genetically Altered Soybeans. 
Corn, 17 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 179 (2000); Toshio Aritake & Gary G. Yerkey, Japan Readiesfor GMO 
Labeling as Businesses Shift to Non-GMO Products, 16 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1352 (1999); Toshio 
Aritake, Japan Weighs Safety Guidelinesfor Production ofGMO Crops, 16 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1353 
(1999); Toshio Aritake, Japan to Inspect Imported GMO Corn. Soybeans. Rapeseeds. MHW Officials Say, 16 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1353 (1999); Japan Bans Production of Genetically Modified Corn Crops, 16 Int'I 
Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1064 (1999); Clinton Calls for Single Standard to Determine Safety ofGMO Crops, 16 
In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1049 (1999); Governments to Discuss Restarting Stalemated Talks on Biosafety 
Pact, GMOs, 16 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1044 (1999); Daniel Pruzin, U.s. Says WTO Should Work with 
Codex on Labeling Standards for GMO Products, 16 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1040 1999); OECD to 
Continue Harmonization Work Despite Differing Policies Among Members, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 
1010 (1999); u.s.. Canada Lodge Complaints over Rapid Rise in Genetic Labeling Measures, 16 Int'I Trade 
Rep. (BNA), at 1006 (1999); EC Freezes Approval of u.s. GMO Seed Following Report of Harm to Butter-
flies, 16 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 886 (1999). See generally Genetically Modified Food. Foodfor Thought, 
THE ECONOMIST, June 19,1999, at 19; Ending a Genetic Food Fight, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 28,1999, at 
20. Infonnation on the OECD's Program on the Hannonization of Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology is 
available at <www.oecd.org/ehs> (last visited Feb. 2000). 
2 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 
1994, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, reprinted in Uruguay Round 
Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and Required 
Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, I 03d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. I, at 1318, 1981 (1994) [hereinafter 
SPS Agreement]. 
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crimination by an importing country among importers; and 2) nondiscrimination be-
tween imported goods and the domestic-like product. Despite its commitment to the 
goal of liberal trade, GATT does permit WTO members to restrict imports on a num-
ber of specific grounds. Of the ten enumerated general exceptions, the public health 
and safety exception touches directly on the promulgation and enforcement of food 
safety laws, standards, and regulations.3 
The national treatment obligation generally requires WTO members not to dis-
criminate against imports vis-a-vis the domestic like product.4 When an importing 
member's food safety standards discriminate against imported goods in favor of the 
domestic like product, the exporting member may have a legitimate complaint under 
Article XXIII that a trade benefit has been nullified or impaired. Similarly, to the 
extent the importing member's food safety regulations purport to have extraterritorial 
effect (for example, by targeting the production processes and methods by which the 
imported product was manufactured or processed by the exporting member), Article 
IlI:4 also may be violated. At the same time, however, GATT does not prevent a 
country from setting its own domestic priorities regarding the level of food safety it 
wants to achieve at home. The GATT food safety exception provides: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ... 5 
Thus, in order for an importing country to impose a GATT -permissible health or 
safety import measure, that measure must be necessary (i.e., no less trade restrictive 
alternative is available), must not discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably between 
countries where the same conditions prevail (i.e., it must be consistent with the most 
favored nation and national treatment obligations), and must not be a disguised re-
striction on international trade. 
Considering the open-textured quality of the terms "necessary," "arbitrarily," and 
"unjustifiably," the public health and safety exception has the potential for being a 
source of nontariff barriers to trade. Given the vagueness of the public health and 
safety exception, there is a potential for abuse by economically powerful countries 
against weaker trading nations. The GATT practice generally has been to construe 
Article XX narrowly in favor of trade and against nontariff barriers to trade. A GATT 
panel report concluded that the Thai ban on imported cigarettes was not "necessary" 
within the meaning of the chapeau to GATT Article XX:6 
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other GATT 
provisions as "necessary" ... if an alternative measure which it could rea-
sonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT 
provisions is available to it. Similarly, in cases where a measure consistent 
J General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A-II. T.I.A.S. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
art. XX [hereinafter GATT). 
4 GATT, art. 111:4. 
~ GATT, art. XX(b). 
• Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th 
Supp.) at 200 (1991). 
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with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party 
is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which 
entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.7 
83 
This interpretation of "necessary" restates the minimum derogation principle, i.e., 
any measure taken under one of the Article XX exceptions must be the least trade 
restrictive measure available. 
III. THE SPS AGREEMENT 
The most important WTO agreement that addresses food safety issues is the SPS 
Agreement. Experience has shown that SPS measures are employed frequently as 
other, more traditional barriers to trade, such as tariffs and quotas, are reduced or 
eliminated. Many countries, including the United States, often have had the experi-
ence of negotiating the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of quotas only to be 
met with a suspect SPS measure that eliminates the benefit of the earlier bargain. 
Before the SPS Agreement was added to the GATT -WTO legal partnership, Articlc 
XX(b) was the only GATT provision dealing expressly with the subject of SPS mea-
sures. Until the SPS Agreement, no multilateral trade agreement existed with a fully 
articulated set of procedural rules governing a country's use of SPS measures in con-
nection with imported goods. The SPS Agreement fills this gap by circumscribing 
WTO members' use of such measures as a nontariff barrier to trade. K 
The SPS Agreement applies to all SPS measures that may, directly or indirectly, 
affect international trade. The SPS Agreement does not establish any substantive SPS 
mcasures per se. Instead, the Agreement sets forth a number of general procedural 
requirements to ensure that an SPS measure is in fact a scientifically-based protection 
against the risk asserted by the member imposing the measure, and not a disguised 
barrier to trade.9 
The Agreement expressly recognizes that members have a legitimate right to 
protect human, animal, and plant life and health, and to establish a level of protection 
for life and health that they deem appropriate. The provisions of the SPS Agreement 
are designed to preserve the ability of members to act in this area while at the same 
time guarding against the use of unjustified SPS measures that are designed primarily 
to protect a domestic industry from foreign competition. The Agreement establishes 
criteria and procedures to distinguish the former from the latter. It emphasizes the 
need for transparency in the SPS regulatory process. 
A. The Definition of SPS Measures 
The SPS Agreement provides a comprehensive definition of SPS measures. An 
SPS measure is any measure applied: I) to protect animal or plant life or health within 
the territory of the member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread 
of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms, or disease-causing organisms; 2) to 
protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the member from risks 
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in foods, 
7/d. (quoting Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, .1989, GATT 8.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, ~ 
5.26 (1990)). 
, See SPS Agreement, supra note 2. The text of the SPS Agreement is available at <www.wto.orglwto.goods/ 
spsagr.htm> (last visited Feb. 2000). 
9 See SPS Agreement art. 2.3. 
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beverages, or foodstuffs; 3) to protect human life or health within the territory of the 
member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants, or products thereof, 
or from the entry, establishment, or spread of pests; or 4) to prevent or limit other 
damage within the territory of the member from the entry, establishment, or spread of 
pests.1O 
SPS measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements, and 
procedures governing inter alia: I) end product criteria; 2) processes and production 
methods; 3) testing, inspection, certification, and approval procedures; 4) quarantine 
requirements including relevant requirements associated with the transport of ani-
mals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during transport; 5) 
provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures, and methods of risk 
assessment; and 6) packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety.11 
I f a measure is not intended to protect against one of these risks, then the measure is 
not an SPS measure. 
B. The Use of Scientifically-Based Measures 
The basic right of WTO members under the SPS Agreement is the ability to take 
SPS measures necessary for the protection of human, 'animal, or plant life or health. 
This right is qualified by three provisions. Such measures must be applied only to the 
extent necessary, must be based on scientific principles, and must not be maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence, except that such measures may be imposed tem-
porarily when evidence is insufficient, pending receipt of additional information nec-
essary for a more objective assessment of risk. 12 Article 2.3 reiterates the threshold 
inquiry of the GATT Article XX chapeau, namely, that SPS measures must not con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, and must not constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade.13 A member's failure to satisfy Articles 
2.2 and 2.3 would in itself constitute a violation of GATT, regardless of the measure's 
consistency with the remainder of GATT. 
A member is free to establish its own level of SPS protection, including a "zero 
risk" level ifit so chooses. Regardless of the level of risk a member chooses to adopt, 
however, a measure must be based on scientific principles and on sufficient scientific 
evidence. The judgments to be drawn from that evidence are left to the member, be-
10 ld. Annex A, '1 I (a)-(d). 
" [d. 
12 Article 2.2 provides: Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to 
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5. 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement provides: 
In cases where relevant scientific is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the rel-
evant international organizations as well as from sanitary and phytosanitary measures applied by 
other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary and phytosanitary measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time. 
In tandem, these two articles represent the SPS Agreement's version of the precautionary principle; ld. arts. 2.2, 
5.7. 
13 Article 2.3 provides: 
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifi-
ably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between 
their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be 
applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. 
[d. art. 2.3. 
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cause scientific certainty is rare. Many scientific determinations require judgments 
among competing scientific views. 
C. The Use of International Standards 
The SPS Agreement encourages members to harmonize their SPS measures by 
adopting international standards where such standards exist. 14 Such international stan-
dards, guidelines, and recommendations are developed by several international bod-
ies. The most important are the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) established 
in 1963 and jointly administered by the World Health Organization and the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization;15 the International Office of Epizootics 
(OlE) founded in 1924 and charged with the tasks of developing a worldwide live-
stock reporting system and expediting trade in livestock without increasing livestock 
disease; 16 and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) 
an agreement intended to prevent the spread of plant pests. 17 
Although the SPS Agreement generally obligates members to adopt international 
standards where they exist, the Agreement further provides that members may adopt 
more stringent standards if, based on scientific justification, the relevant international 
standard fails to provide an adequate level of protection. The Committee on SPS Mea-
sures has established a system under which standards, guidelines, and recommenda-
tions developed by the Codex, OlE, and IPPC that have a major trade impact are to be 
monitored. It may invite the appropriate international standards-setting body to con-
sider reviewing the existing standards, guidelines, or recommendations. On July 8, 
1999, the SPS Committee decided to extend its provisional procedure adopted in Oc-
tober 1997 to monitor the process of international harmonization until July 2001. 18 
The Agreement offers an incentive for the adoption of international standards by 
establishing a rebuttable presumption that a national SPS measure that is based on an 
international standard is not only necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health, but also is consistent with GATT.19 At the same time, the SPS Agreement 
recognizes the politically sensitive nature of SPS measures for many members that 
14 "Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international standards .... " SPS 
Agreem<:nt art. 3.1 (emphasis added). These international standards, guidelines, and recommendations are fur-
ther defined in Annex A:3 of the SPS Agreement to include those of the Codex, the International Office of 
Epizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention. 
15 Codex has issued more than 200 commodity standards and approximately 2000 maximum limits for 
pesticide residues. General information about Codex, including the contents of the Codex Alimentarius is avail-
able at <www.fao.orglwaicentlfaoinfo/economic/esnicodexlDefault.htm> (last modified Aug. I, 1999). 
16 International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office for Epizootics, Jan. 17, 
1925,57 L.N .T.S. 135. General information about the International Committee, including its publications, is 
available at <www.oie.int> (last visited Feb. 2000). 
17 International Plant Protection Convention, Apr. 3,1952,150 U.N.T.S. 67. The IPPC was revised in 
1997 to address the relationship of the IPPC to the SPS Agreement, in particular the role of the IPPC in promul-
gating internationally harmonized phytosanitary measures and standards. The revised text of the IPPC is re-
printed in WTO, COMMllTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYrOSANITARY MEASURES, Adoption of the New Revised Text of 
the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). Annex I. G/SPS/GEN/51 (Feb. 17, 1998). General 
information about the Convention is available at <www.fao.orglwaicentlfaoinfo/agricultlagp/agpp> (last visited 
Feb. 2000). 
18 See COMMllTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES, Procedure to Monitor the Process of Inter-
national Harmonization, G/SPS/I3 (July 7, 1999). 
19 Article 3.2 provides: Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, 
and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994. SPS Agree-
ment art. 3.2. 
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desire to give their consumers and environment the highest levels of protection. The 
drafters of the SPS Agreement bowed to pressure from environmental groups that 
feared that the SPS Agreement would lead to a ratcheting down of national standards 
if international standards became the mandatory maximum levels of protection a mem-
ber could adopt. This fear was based in part on the status of Codex, OlE, and IPPC as 
arbiters of human, animal, and plant health issues.2o In the eyes of environmentalists, 
these organizations' deliberations largely are influenced by transnational corpora-
tions. 21 Thus, despite the encouragement to adopt international standards, Article 3.3 
permits members to adopt measures that result in a higher level of protection if there 
is a scientific justification for doing SO.22 Consequently, a member's ability to adopt 
standards higher than those promulgated by these organizations is assured. 
D. Making Risk Assessments 
Because the levels of protection established by international bodies are regarded 
as the minimum level attainable, Article 5 permits members to maintain higher levels 
of protection than those based on international standards. "Risk assessment" is de-
fined in two ways, depending on whether human or animal life or health is at stake, or 
whether plant health or life is the focus: 
The evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal health 
arising from the presence of additives, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in 
food, beverages, or foodstuffs. 
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment, or spread of a pest or 
disease within the territory of an importing member according to the SPS mea-
sures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and eco-
nomic consequences.23 
A member must have scientific evidence to justify such higher levels of protec- . 
tion, or must show that it is "the appropriate level of ... protection" as determined 
under the criteria of Article 5.24 As long as there is a scientific justification for a 
particular SPS standard, a member is free to choose its own level of protection after 
determining that the health or safety risk is genuine. The SPS Agreement does not 
require "downward harmonization" through the adoption of less stringent SPS mea-
'0 See PIlILLIP EVAI'S & JAMES WALSIl, TIlE EIU GUIDE TO THE NEW GATT 23 (1994). 
" See id. 
" Article 3.3 provides: 
Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the rel-
evant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or 
as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be 
appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs I through 8 of Article 5. Not-
withstanding the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection 
different from that which would be achieved by measures based on international standards, guide-
lines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement. 
For purposes·ofparagraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and 
evaluation of available scientific information with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a member deter-
mines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its 
appropriate level ofSPS protection. SPS Agreement art. 3.3. 
'.1/d. Annex A, '14. 
24 See id. art. 5.3. 
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sures;25 however, the SPS Agreement does not prevent a country from adopting stan-
dards which are less stringent than relevant international standards either. A country in 
its role as an importer can permit products to enter its market that fail to meet relevant 
international standards.2fi No process exists in the SPS Agreement for challenging the 
adoption of SPS measures that are less protective of human, animal, or plant life and 
health than international standards. A fair argument can be made that an importing 
country's decision to adopt weak SPS measures is of no concern to the WTO, although 
the international human rights community might take a different view. 
The SPS Agreement identifies specific criteria to be used in evaluating the as-
sessment of risk to human, animal, or plant life or health: I) available scientific evi-
dence; 2) inspection, testing, and sampling techniques; 3) relevant ecological and 
environmental conditions; 4) the existence of pest- or disease-free areas; and 5) pro-
duction processes and methodsY In the case of risks to animal and plant life and 
health, the economic impact and effectiveness of SPS measures for both the exporting 
and importing members also are to be considered. In all events, the objectives of 
minimizing negative trade effects, of avoiding discrimination or disguised restric-
tions on trade, and of adopting measures that are not more trade restrictive than re-
quired to achieve the appropriate level of protection are to guide members when im-
posing a level of protection higher than that provided under international standards. 
If a member believes that another member's SPS measure violates the SPS Agree-
ment, the burden rests initially on the complaining member to identify a specific alter-
native measure that is reasonably available. A responding member need not take steps 
that are deemed to be unreasonable. Next, the complaining member must demonstrate 
that the alternative measure would make a significant difference in terms of its effect on 
. trade.28 Once again, the responding member is not expected to adopt an alternative 
measure if doing so would make only an insignificant difference to the impact on trade. 
E. Equivalency and Mutual Recognition of Standards 
Because a range of SPS measures may be available to achieve the same level of 
protection, there may be differences among members' SPS measures that achieve the 
same level of protection. Thus, the principle of equivalency is a key component of the 
SPS Agreement. Members are instructed to accept the measures of other members as 
equivalent, even if they differ formally from those of the importing member, if the 
25 An example of more stringent domestic standards are the pre-I 996 U.S. Delaney Clauses that prohibited 
the introduction offood additives or color additives in processed foods ifthe substances posed any risk of cancer 
in humans or animals. The Delaney Clauses established a level of protection that reflected a congressional 
decision that there should be zero risk of cancer to humans from the substances those clauses covered. That 
congressional determination was based on scientific evidence available at the time of its enactment and a risk 
assessment (i.e., an evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human life or health, even though the risk of 
cancer was slight). The evidence and assessment resulted in a level of zero risk of carcinogenesis. See Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
348( c )(3 )(A) ( 1994)). Under pressure from domestic farm groups, Congress amended the Delaney Clauses in 
the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 to remove chemical pesticides in processed foods from the definition of 
"food additives." See Pub. L. No. 104-170, § 405, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996). Advances in detection techniques had 
developed to the point that pesticide residues could be detected that fell far below levels considered to pose a 
serious health threat. A new health-based standard that permits less than a one in one million lifetime risk of 
cancer was enacted to replace the zero-risk standard set by the Delaney Clauses in connection with pesticide 
residues. The Delaney Clauses continue to apply to food additives, color additives, and compounds administered 
to food-producing animals. 
,,, SPS Agreement, supra note 2. 
27 [d. art. 5.2. 
" [d. art. 5.6. 
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exporting member demonstrates that its measures achieve the importing member's 
appropriate level ofprotection.29 Members are obligated further to enter into consulta-
tions with the aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on recognition 
of equivalence of specified SPS measures. JO 
In the view of some developing countries, a number of developed countries are 
requiring "sameness" rather than "equivalence" of measures.J! In addition, experi-
ence suggests that recognition of equivalence is indeed very difficult to achieve even 
among countries that are economic equals and close trading partners. Take, for ex-
ample, the experience of the European Union (EU) which in 1996 imposed a ban on 
exports of British beef and related products from cattle possibly infected with "mad 
cow" disease. The EU imposed the ban over the objections of the British that its beef 
products posed no health risk and a threat to withdraw from the EU. Even after the EU 
declared British beef safe in late 1999, France continued to block its importation.32 
In a more progressive vein, 1996 amendments to U.S. legislation on poultry and 
meat inspections authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to certify that poultry and 
meat inspection systems of other countries are equivalent to those of the United States.33 
In 1997, the EU and the United States reached a framework agreement on veterinary 
equivalency.34 On July 20, 1999, following this framework agreement, the United 
States and the EU signed a mutual recognition agreement covering trade in live ani-
mals and animal products, including meat, fish, pork, dairy products, pet food, hides, 
and skins.35 
F. Control, inspection, and Approval Procedures 
Conformity assessment procedures (i.e., control, inspection, and product approval 
procedures) are to be conducted under SPS guidelines.36 Procedures are to be under-
taken and completed without undue delay and are to be nondiscriminatory vis-a.-vis 
the procedures for the domestic-like product.37 
29 Article 4.1 provides: 
Members shall accept the sanitary and phytosanitary measures of other Members as equivalent, even 
if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other Members trading in the same 
product, if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its mea-
sures achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. For 
this purpose, reasonable access shall be given, upon request, to the importing Member for inspection, 
testing and other relevant procedures. 
Id. art. 4.1. 
30ld. art. 4.2. 
JI See COMMITTEE 0" SANITARY AND PHYTOSA"ITARY MEASURES, SPS Agreement and Developing Countries, 
G/SPS/GENII28 (July 8, 1999). 
32 See Gillian Sandford, More at Stake than Steak: Britain Aims to Avert Trade War, CHRISTlA" SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct. 29, 1999, at 7. 
33 See Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (I 957)(codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470, 466); Federal Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242,34 Stat. 1260 (1907), revised by 
the Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-20 1.81 Stat. 584 (1967)(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-
695,620). The United States and the EU have been engaged in intense negotiations to conclude mutual recogni-
tion agreements on food and labeling requirements. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S .. EU Fail to Meet MRA Deadline; 
New Talks Slated/or Later This Month. 141nt'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 225 (1997). 
34 See Rosella Brevetti, U.s. and EU Agree on Framework On Veterinary Equivalency Except/or Poul-
try, 14 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), at 807 (1997); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S .-EU Animal Trade Pact Set to Take Effect 
with New USDA Rules, 161nt'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1091 (1999). 
35 See Yerkey. supra note 34; European Union and the United States Sign Veterinary Agreement. Press 
Release. July 20, 1999, available at <www.eurunion.org/news/press/1999/1999048.htm>(Iast visited Feb. 2000). 
36 SPS Agreement art. 8, Annex C: I (a). 
37 See id. 
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The concept of disease-free areas and zones within an exporting member is to be 
recognized by importing members. This concept ensures that exports of a particular 
product are not banned on a country-wide basis, if it can be shown that the exporting 
member has implemented effective quarantine or buffer zone measures. 
G. Administration 
A Committee on SPS Measures (the Committee) was established to provide a 
forum for regular consultations. The Committee is responsible for maintaining close 
contact with the relevant international bodies in the field of SPS protection.38 It also 
monitors the process of international harmonization and the use of international stan-
dards.39 The SPS Agreement requires the Committee to develop a procedure for moni-
toring the process of international harmonization and the use of international stan-
dards, guidelines, or recommendations.40 A provisional procedure was adopted in 
1997,41 and in July 1999, the Committee agreed to extend its harmonization work 
program until July 2001.42 
Members must notify the Committee of new, or modifications to existing, SPS 
regulations that substantially are not the same as an international standard and that 
may have a significant effect on international trade. As of the end of 1996, the Com-
mittee had received 396 such notifications from thirty-one WTO members.43 Article 
12.7 directs the Committee to review the operation and implementation of the Agree-
ment three years after its entry into force. 44 
H. Dispute Settlement 
As is the case for all WTO disputes, the consultation and dispute settlement pro-
cedures of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII, as amplified by the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, apply to disputes under the SPS Agreement.45 If a dispute under the 
SPS Agreement involves scientific or technical issues, the panel is directed to seek 
advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties.46 
I. Implementation at the Sub-Federal Level 
Under Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, members are responsible for ensuring 
that their sub-federal levels of government and nongovernmental organizations re-
38 See SPS COMMIITEE, Report (I 999) on the Activities of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, GIL/315 (July 2S, 1999). The Committee's 1999 Report notes that "[t]he SPS Committee continued 
to maintain close working relationships with the IPPC, the OlE and Codex." !d. ~I O. 
39 See id. arts. 12.1, 12.4. 
40 See id. arts. 3.5, 12.4. 
41 See COMMITTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES, Procedure to Monitor the Process ofInter-
national Harmonization, G/SPS/I3 (July 12, 1999). 
42 See COMMITTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES, Decision to Extend the Provisional Proce-
dure to Monitor the Process of International Harmonization, G/SPS/14 (July 12, 1999). 
43 COMMITTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES, GIL/lIS (1996) (last modified Jan. 19, 2000) 
<www.wto.orglwto/goodslagric.htm>. 
44 COMMITTEE ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES, Procedure to Review the Operation and Imple-
mentation of the Agreement, G/SPS/I 0 (Oct. 21, 1997). 
45 See id. art. II. 
46 See id. art. 11.2. For example, in the 1997 WTO Panel report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), the panel consulted scientific experts. See Report of the WTO Panel, EC Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTIDS26/R/USA (Aug. IS, 1997) [hereinafter WTO 
Hormone Report]. 
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sponsible for setting standards comply with the provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
Members are required to formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms 
in support of observance of the SPS Agreement by sub-national government bodies. 
State and local governments within the United States remain free to set their own 
SPS standards under the terms of the SPS Agreement. They are under no obligation to 
adopt federal standards, unless Congress so mandates under its commerce clause power.47 
1. Extraterritoriality 
The definition of SPS measures in Annex A of the SPS Agreement-"measures 
to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member"-settles 
an issue regarding the extraterritorial application of SPS measures that arose in an 
unadopted GATT panel report.48 The panel concluded that application of measures 
taken under Article XX (b) are limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the country 
imposing the measures. Conceding that the United States' ban on imports of tuna was 
not a disguised restriction on trade, but rather a bona fide measure designed to protect 
dolphins inadvertently caught with tuna in purse-seine nets, the panel ruled that the 
U.S. measure could not extend in any event beyond its territorial jurisdiction. As 
noted by the GATT panel, if the rule were otherwise, then, 
each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health protec-
tion policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate without 
jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement. The General Agree-
ment would then no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among 
all contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of 
trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal 
regulations.49 
The GATT panel concluded that unilateral, extraterritorial application by the 
United States of health regulations under Article XX(b) is impermissible. Neverthe-
less, under the SPS Agreement, a member may insist, for example, that imported food 
meet its health and safety standards, provided those standards are based on science 
and risk assessment. 
K. Relationship to the Agreement on Agriculture 
The problem of misuse of SPS measures is acute especially in connection with 
imports of agricultural products that frequently are the target of legitimate, and not so 
legitimate, SPS measures. There was a concern in some quarters that as the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (Agreement on Agriculture)50 eliminated or reduced 
barriers to agricultural trade, a new set of SPS measures would be introduced as con-
tingent protection, that is, whose sole purpose would be to protect domestic agricul-
47 In 1997, tension built between 12 states and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over allegedly 
lax en forcement of clean air and clean water regulations by the states. The EPA threatened to cut off federal funds 
and to limit the authority of those states to enforce those laws. See James L. Tyson, States Feud with EPA Over 
Regulations, CHRISTIAI': SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 19, 1997, at 4. 
4' Restrictions on Imports ofTuna, GATT 8.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, 198-200, ""5.24-5.29 (unadopted 
1991), reprinted ill 30 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1594-1623 (1991). 
4' ld. "5.27. 
'0 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, reprillted in STATEMENT Of ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIOI':, supra 
note 2, at 1355. 
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tural producers from import competition.51 To counter such a development preemp-
tively, the SPS Agreement was negotiated in tandem with the Agreement on Agricul-
ture to ensure that the benefits of liberalized agricultural trade are not diluted. Indeed, 
the Agreement on Agriculture underscores the importance of not allowing unjustified 
SPS measures to undermine the gains of the Agreement on Agriculture by providing 
that "Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures."52 
L. Relationship to the TBT Agreement 
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) excludes 
from its scope of coverage SPS measures as defined in the SPS Agreement.53 The SPS 
Agreement similarly provides that it does not affect members' rights under the TBT 
Agreement with respect to measures outside the scope of the SPS Agreement.54 De-
spite their mutual exclusivity, the substantive provisions of the two agreements mirror 
each other in most respects. A significant difference between the SPS and TBT Agree-
ments is the test used to determine whether a measure is impermissibly protectionist 
in nature. The TBT Agreement relies on a nondiscrimination test, whereas the in-
quiry under the SPS Agreement is whether the measure has a scientific justification 
and is based on risk assessment. A strict requirement of nondiscrimination would not 
be practicable for SPS measures that discriminate against imported goods based on 
their origin. Goods may pose a risk of disease preeisely because the goods come from 
a member where such disease is prevalent. The same situation might not be true for 
similar goods coming from another member. Discrimination is, therefore, tolerated 
under the SPS Agreement so long as it is not arbitrary or unjustifiable. 
IV. WTO RESOLUTION OF SPS DISPUTES 
By the end of 1999, the WTO had resolved three SPS trade disputes; the first 
dealt with human health and safety (EC-Beef Hormone); the second addressed ani-
mal health and life (Australia-Salmon); and the third resolved a phytosanitary dis-
pute (Japan-Food Quarantine).55 
A. The EC Beef Hormone Dispute 
The first WTO panel report to address the consistency of a member's food safety 
measures under the SPS Agreement was issued in 1997. The panel ruled in EC Mea-
sures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) that European Community 
(EC) measures restricting the importation of beef from cattle that were fed growth 
hormones violated the SPS Agreement. 56 The Appellate Body upheld in part, modi-
fied in part, and reversed in part the panel report. 57 
II See id. 
" Id. art. 14. 
53 See TBT Agreement art. 1.5, supra note 2. 
54 See SPS Agreement art. 1.4. 
55 For additional analysis of these disputes, see Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agree-
ment of the World Trade Organization and the International Trade of Dairy Products, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
55 (1999). 
56 See WTO Hormone Report, at 218, ~~ 8.214, 8.216. 
57 See Report of the Appellate Body, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS261 AB/R, WTIDS481 AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Hormone Report]. Both Canada 
and the United States brought WTO complaints against the EC's measures affecting livestock and meat. 
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The events leading up to the WTO panel proceeding span ten years. Following 
consumer concerns over the safety of hormone-fed beef, the EC in 1987 imposed a ban 
on imports of animals and meat from animals fed six specific growth-promoting hor-
mones.58 The United States and Canada objected to this ban on the ground that the six 
hormones had been found safe for use in growth promotion by every country that had 
examined them.59 In addition, Codex had reviewed five of the six hormones and found 
them to be safe. Additionally, the EC itself twice commissioned experts to review 
these same five hormones, and on both occasions they found them to be safe.60 
The United States raised the matter under the Tokyo Round Agreement on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (the Standards Code) in March 1987.61 Bilateral consultations 
between the United States and the EC failed to resolve the dispute. Contending that 
the EC ban was not supported by scientific evidence, the United States requested the 
establishment ofa technical experts group-under Article 14.5 of the Standards Code-
to examine the question. The EC rejected this request, stating that the issue was out-
side the scope of the Standards Code.62 
On January I, 1989, the United States imposed retaliatory measures of 100% ad 
valorem duties on imports of certain EC-origin goods.63 A joint U.S.-EC Task Force 
reached an interim agreement that permitted imports ,of U.S. beef that was certified 
hormone-free. The United States in return lifted some of its retaliatory tariffs. In June 
1996, the EC requested the establishment of a WTO panel to examine the matter. A 
month later, the United States removed the balance of its retaliatory tariffs pending 
the outcome of the panel proceeding. 
1. The WTO Panel Report 
Both the United States and the EC invoked the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agree-
ment, and GATT in support of their respective positions. As a threshold matter, the 
panel considered whether the SPS Agreement, which entered into force on January 1, 
1995, could apply to measures that predate it. The panel concluded that under the 
general rules of treaty interpretation found in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, the EC measures are continuing situations that were enacted 
before the SPS Agreement entered into force but which did not cease to exist after that 
date. The panel found no contrary intention in the SPS Agreement; in fact, it found 
that the Agreement generally applies to measures enacted before its entry into force 
but which are maintained in force after that date.64 Having found that the SPS Agree-
ment is applicable to the dispute, the panel next concluded that the TBT Agreement a 
fortiori was inapplicable. By their terms, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement 
are mutually exclusive.65 
" Three of the hormones are naturally occurring in animals and humans; the other three are artificially 
produced. For additional background on the dispute, see Kristin Mueller, HormonaL ImbaLance: An Analysis of 
the Hormone Treated Beef Trade Dispute Between the United States and the European Union, I DRAKE 1. 
AGRIC. L. 97 (1996); Note, The EC Hormone Ban Dispute and the Application of the Dispute Sel/Lement 
Provisions of the Standards Code, 10 MICH, J.INT'L L. 872 (1989); Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
WTO Hormones Report Confirms u.s. Win, Press Release 97-76, Aug. 18, 1997. 
S9 See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 6-8, II, '\1'\12.17-2,25, 2.33, 
60 See id. 
61 See Office of the U ,So Trade Representative Press Release, supra note 58. 
(0' See id, 
61 See id.; see also Mueller, supra note 58. 
04 See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 170, '\1'\18,25-8.26, 
6S SeeTBT Agreement art, 1.5; SPS Agreement art. 1.4; WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 171, '\1 
8.29. 
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Finally, with regard to the applicability of GATT, the panel found that there is no 
requirement in the SPS Agreement that a prior GATT violation be established before 
the SPS Agreement applies. Moreover, even if a measure were to pass muster under 
GATT, it still would have to be examined for consistency with the SPS Agreement. 
Therefore, the panel limited its examination to the consistency of the EC measure 
under the SPS Agreement.66 . 
The United States argued that the burden of proof rested on the EC to provide 
evidence that there is a risk to be protected against and that there has been a risk assess-
ment. The EC responded that the burden of proof rests on the party challenging the 
consistency of a sanitary measure with the SPS Agreement to provide evidence that the 
use of the hormones in dispute is safe and without risk. 67 The panel stated that, 
the initial burden of proof rests on the complaining party in the sense that it 
bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case of inconsistency with the SPS 
Agreement. It is, indeed, for the party that initiated the dispute settlement 
proceedings to put forward factual and legal arguments in order to substantiate 
its claim that a sanitary measure is inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. In 
other words, it is for the United States to present factual and legal arguments 
that, ifunrebutted, would demonstrate a violation of the SPS Agreement. Once 
such a prima facie case is made, however, we consider that, at least with re-
spect to the obligations imposed by the SPS Agreement that are relevant to this 
case, the burden of proof shifts to the responding party.68 
Accordingly, the United States had the burden of presenting a prima facie case of 
inconsistency with the SPS Agreement. Once that initial burden was met, the burden 
would shift to the EC to demonstrate that its measures did not violate the SPS Agreement. 
The panel began its analysis with Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement that requires 
members "to base their [SPS] measures on international standards, guidelines or rec-
ommendations, where they exist. ... "69 The SPS Agreement defines "international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations" as those established by Codex relating to 
veterinary drug residues.70 In line with Article 3.1, if such Codex standards exist with 
respect to the six hormones in dispute, then, the panel stated, a sanitary measure taken 
by a member either should be based on these standards or be justified under Article 
3.3 of the SPS Agreement.7! 
Unless a member's measure reflects the same level of protection as the standard, 
it is not "based on" that standard and violates Article 3.1. The panel found that Codex 
standards exist for five of the six hormones in issue.72 The panel further found that the 
EC measures resulted in a different level of protection than would be achieved by 
measures based on the Codex standards. The EC measures, accordingly, were not 
based on the Codex standards for purposes of Article 3.1. 
Even though a member's measures are not based on international standards, they 
are not inconsistent with the SPS Agreement ipso facto. Article 3.3 of the SPS Agree-
ment provides an exception to Article 3.1. It permits members to introduce measures 
66 See WTO Honnone Report, supra note 46, at 172-74, ~~ 8.38-8.42. 
67 See id. at 174-75, ~~ 8.49-8.50. 
68Id. at 175, ~ 8.51 (footnote omitted) . 
• 9 SPS Agreement art 3.1. 
7Dld. Annex A:3(a). 
71 See WTO Honnone Report, supra note 46, at 176, ~~ 8.56-8.57. 
72 See id. at 180, ~ 8.70. 
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that result in a higher level of protection than would be achieved under international 
standards, if there is a scientific justification for them, or it is the level of protection a 
member determines to be appropriate after making a risk assessment under Article 5 
of the Agreement. There is a scientific justification if, based on available scientific 
information, a member determines that the international standards are not sufficient 
to achieve its appropriate level of protection.73 This concept is sometimes referred to 
as "the acceptable level of risk. "74 
Once the United States established that the EC measures were not based on an 
international standard, the burden shifted to the EC to prove that its measures are 
justified under Article 3.3 and meet the risk assessment criteria of Article 5.75 Accord-
ing to Annex A:4 of the SPS Agreement, a risk assessment is "the evaluation of the 
potential for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of . 
. . contaminants ... in food, beverages or foodstuffs. "76 The EC thus had the burden of 
identifying the adverse effects on human health caused by the presence of hormones 
in meat products and if any such adverse effects exist, evaluating the potential or 
probability of occurrence of these effects.77 
To assist it in determining whether there is a scientific basis for the EC ban, the 
panel appointed three scientific experts to advise the panel. 78 After considering all of 
the sources cited by the EC in support of the first prong of the two-pronged risk 
assessment test, the panel concluded that none of the scientific evidence cited indi-
cates that an identifiable risk arises for human health from the use of the growth 
hormones in issue.79 In fact, all of the studies cited by the EC indicate that such hor-
mones are safe when used in accordance with good practice.80 
Once the risks are assessed, i.e., their probability of occurrence identified, the next 
step is risk management, i.e., the decision by a member as to what risks it can accept, or 
its "appropriate level of sanitary protection." If a risk assessment is based on scientific 
evidence, then a member can set its own acceptable level of risk, provided the level is 
not arbitrary or unjustifiable, takes into account the objective of minimizing negative 
trade effects, and is not a disguised restriction on international trade.8 ) 
Because there was no scientific evidence of an identifiable risk associated with 
the growth hormones, the panel found that no basis exists under the SPS Agreement 
for the EC's adoption of any measure to achieve any level of protection. If it were 
otherwise, then the obligations of Article 5 would be eviscerated. Assuming arguendo 
such scientific evidence did exist, the panel continued, the EC measures were arbi-
trary, unjustifiable, discriminatory, and a disguised restriction on trade in connection 
with naturally occurring hormones. The panel concluded that the measures distin-
guished between products with higher hormone residues that are endogenous (natu-
rally occurring), such as eggs and soy oil that were not subject to an import ban, and 
the imported meat and meat products with lower hormone residues that are endog-
enous as wel1.82 With regard to the synthetic hormones, the EC measures set a "no 
73 See SPS Agreement art. 3.3 n.2. 
74 See SPS Agreement Annex A:5. 
75 See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 185, ~~ 8.87-8.89. 
76 SPS Agreement Annex A:4. 
77 See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 187, '18.98. 
7R Pursuant to Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement and Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
For the experts' analyses and conclusions, see WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 113-61, ~~ 6.1-6.241, 
and the Annex to the Report. . 
79 See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 196, ~ 8.124 . 
• 0 See id. 
" See SPS Agreement arts. 5.4,5.5,2.3. 
K2 See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 214, 215, ~~ 8.197, 8.203. 
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residue" level for those honnones when used as growth promoters, but set an unlim-
ited residue level for naturally occurring honnones. Because the EC could not justify 
the significant difference in treatment, the panel concluded that the measure was arbi-
trary, unjustifiable, and discriminatory.83 
2. The Appellate Decision 
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's conclusions in most respects; it reversed 
the panel's findings and conclusions on Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, but agreed 
with its conclusions that the EC measures violate Article 5.1 of the Agreement. 84 The 
Appellate Body agreed with the panel that although the EC measures under challenge 
predated the entry into force of the SPS Agreement, the SPS Agreement nevertheless 
governed the parties' dispute.85 The Appellate Body noted that the SPS Agreement 
does not contain any provision limiting its temporal application, and that Article 
XVI:4 of the Agreement establishing the WTO obligates members to bring their na-
tionallaws and regulations into confonnity with the WTO Agreements (i.e., no exist-
ing legislation is grandfathered).86 
Regarding the panel's allocation of burden of proof, the Appellate Body rejected 
the panel's allocation to the responding member where the SPS measure under chal-
lenge is not based on an international standard. The Appellate Body reversed that 
panel, instructing that complaining members should be required to present evidence 
and legal arguments sufficient to demonstrate that the EC measures were inconsistent 
with each Article of the SPS Agreement addressed by the panel. H7 
In response to the EC's claim that the panel failed to apply the appropriate stan-
dard of review in assessing certain facts and scientific material, the Appellate Body 
observed as a threshold matter that the SPS Agreement was silent on the question of 
the appropriate standard of review. Focusing on Article II of the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding, the Appellate Body concluded that the proper standard of re-
view was neither a de novo nor a deferential standard, but rather an "objective assess-
ment" standard.88 Turning to the panel's objective assessment of the facts, the Appel-
late Body was constrained to conclude that the panel had not failed to discharge its 
duty under DSU Article 11.89 While conceding that the panel's assessment was not 
error-free, the Appellate Body could not say that the panel disregarded deliberately, 
willfully distorted, or willfully misrepresented evidence.9o 
In part, the EC defended its measures on the ground that they were based on the 
"precautionary principle" which states that as long as there is some scientific basis for 
adopting a particular SPS measure, such measure should satisfy the SPS Agreement. 91 
The Appellate Body agreed that the precautionary principle is reflected in Articles 5.7 
and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, declined to state whether it was part of customary 
international law, and agreed with the panel that whatever its status, the precaution-
ary principle does not override the provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agree-
ment dealing with risk assessment.92 In this case, the EC failed to carry out a proper 
risk assessment. 
" See id. at 218, '1'1 8.214, 8.216. 
'4 See Appellate Body Honnone Report, supra note 57. 
"See id. at 47-48, ~128. 
'bId. 
H7 Id. at 39, '1109. 
"Id. at 43, '1117. 
HOld. at 50-55, ~~ 135-145. 
90ld . 
• " /d. at 46-47, ~~ 123-125. 
921d. 
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Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement obligates members to base their SPS measures 
on international standards, except as otherwise provided in the Agreement. The panel 
equated the phrase "based on" with "conform to."93 The Appellate Body rejected the 
panel's reading of Article 3.1, concluding that the plain meaning of "based on" is 
built upon, not "in compliance with."94 Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement permits 
members to adopt SPS measures that afford a higher standard of protection than would 
an international standard, however, a member may do so only if they comply with 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement dealing with scientific justification and risk assess-
ment.95 
Taking the phrase from Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement that an SPS measure 
must be "based on a risk assessment," the panel insisted that under Article 5.1 the 
competent EC authorities actually had to take into account risk assessment studies at 
the time they promulgated their SPS measures in order to satisfy the "minimum pro-
cedural requirement" of Articles 5.1 and 5.2.96 The Appellate Body rejected the panel's 
interpretation of Article 5.1. The Appellate Body concluded that a member could rely 
on risk assessment studies performed by another member when making its Article 5 
risk assessment, and that risk assessment studies did not have to precede the promul-
gation of the SPS measure under 'ihallenge.97 Nevertheless, the EC had failed to carry 
out a proper risk assessment. 
With regard to the panel's conclusion that the EC's measures violated Article 5.5 
of the SPS Agreement as being arbitrary or unjustifiable, the Appellate Body reversed. 
It assayed the evidence and concluded: 
We are unable to share the inference that the Panel apparently draws that the 
import ban on treated meat and the Community-wide prohibition of the usc 
of the hormones here in dispute for growth promotion purposes in the beef 
sector were not really designed to protect its population from the risk of 
cancer, but rather to keep out US and Canadian hormone-treated beef and 
thereby protect the domestic beef producers in the EC.9H 
The EC measures on hormone-treated beef failed to satisfy the SPS Agreement on 
two counts: I) all available scientific evidence, as well as the experts consulted by the 
panel, stated that the hormones in question are safe when used in accordance with 
good practice; and 2) the EC had failed to conduct a risk assessment that satisfied the 
provisions of the SPS Agreement. Even as late as September 1999, the European 
Commission conceded that no scientific evidence existed to show that hormone-treated 
beef poses a health risk.99 Following the refusal of the EC to rescind its import ban, in 
July 1999, the WTO approved American and Canadian sanctions on EC imports of 
$124.5 million.loo 
93 See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 40, at 176, 180, '1'18.56-8.57,8.70. 
94 See Appellate Body Hormone Report, supra note 57, at 63, ~ 163. 
95 Id. at oS, '1 176 . 
.. See WTO Hormone Report, supra note 46, at 196, '1 X.124. 
9) See Appellate Body Hormone Report, supra note 57. at 74, '1190. 
9' Id. at 96, '1245. 
99 See Joe Kirwin. EC Internal Document Concedes Pl'Oofls Lacking on Beef Hormone Allegations, 16 
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1529 (1999). 
'00 See Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Appmves u.s., Canada Sanctions on EU of $124.5 
Million in Beef Hormone Dispute, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1158 (1999). 
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B. The Australia Salmon Dispute 
In 1996, Australia imposed an import ban on uncooked salmon from the Pacific 
rim of North America ostensibly to prevent the introduction of certain exotic dis-
eases. 101 Fresh, chilled, or frozen salmon could be imported into Australia only if it 
was heat treated prior to importation. Canada complained that the import ban violated 
the SPS Agreement to the extent that the Australian import ban was not based on a 
risk assessment conducted in conformity with Article 5 of that Agreement. 102 
The central question presented to the Appellate Body was the same as the one 
presented in the Beef Hormone dispute: Did Australia carry out a proper risk assess-
ment under Article 5.1 of the .SPS Agreement?103 Australia contended that a 1996 
Final Report constituted a risk assessment for purposes of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agree-
ment. 104 The Appellate Body found that a proper risk assessment must: 1) identifY the 
diseases whose entry or spread the member wants to prevent; 2) evaluate the probabil-
ity of entry of a pest or disease, not just the possibility of such entry; and 3) evaluate 
the likelihood of entry, establishment, or spread of these diseases according to the SPS 
measures which might be applied. lOS Because the 1996 Final Report did not contain 
an evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment, or spread of the diseases of 
concern nor an evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment, or spread of these 
diseases according to the SPS measures which might be applied, the 1996 Final Re-
port could not qualifY as a risk assessment. Australia, therefore, acted inconsistently 
with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
The Appellate Body also upheld the panel's finding that Australia's import pro-
hibition was arbitrary, unjustifiable, and a disguised restriction on international trade. 
While herring and ornamental fin-fish presented an equal or greater risk of the intro-
duction and spread of disease that could threaten domestic stocks, the Australian im-
port ban was limited strictly to salmon.106 This fact gave rise to a strong inference that 
the import ban was intended and designed to protect the domestic salmon aquaculture 
industry from import competition. 
The Appellate Body did, however, reverse the panel's finding that Australia vio-
lated Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement relating to alternative SPS measures that are 
available reasonably to the member. 107 Because Il;o evidence was offered to show what 
level of protection could be achieved by each of the four alternative SPS measures 
mentioned in the 1996 Final Report, it was not possible to state definitely that Austra-
lia had or had not violated Article 5.6.108 
In dictum, the Appellate Body reconfirmed that members have the right to deter-
mine their own appropriate level of SPS protection, however, the "appropriate level" 
is to be distinguished from the actual SPS measure adopted. The SPS measure adopted 
has to be a method that is related rationally to achieving the appropriate level of 
protection. Also, whatever appropriate level of protection a member chooses, a mem-
101 See Report of the WTO Panel, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation a/Salmon, WT/DS 18/R ~ 
1.1 (June 12, 1998). 
102 See id. ~ 3.2. 
103 Report of the Appellate Body, Measures Affecting Importation a/Salmon, AB-1998-S, WT/DS 181 
ABIR, at 72, ~ 112 (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Salmon Report]. 
104 Australia contended in the 1996 Final Report that imports of uncooked salmon should be prohibited in 
order to prevent the introduction and spread of exotic diseases within Australia. 
10' Appellate Body Salmon Report, supra note I 03, ~ 121. 
106 See id. ~~ 177-178. 
107 See id. ~ 241. 
lOR See id. ~ 242. 
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ber may choose "zero risk" as an appropriate level of protection under the SPS Agree-
ment. The Appellate Body clarified that, 
it is important to distinguish ... between the evaluation of "risk" in a risk 
assessment and the determination of the appropriate level of protection. As 
stated in our Report in European Communities - Hormones, the "risk" evalu-
ated in a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk; theoretical uncer-
tainty is "not the kind of risk which, under Article 5.1, is to be assessed." 
This does not mean, however, that a member cannot determine its own ap-
propriate level of protection to be "zero risk."109 
The Appellate Body's decision is an important on6 for determining what constitutes a 
proper risk assessment in the context of the spread of pests and diseases. What a 
proper risk assessment will be in the context of additives or contaminants to food 
remains to be seen. 
C. The Japan Food Quarantine Dispute 
To prevent the introduction of codling moth, a pest of quarantine significance to 
Japan, since 1950 Japan has had in place a requirement that the efficacy of quarantine 
treatment for each variety of certain agricultural products be tested and confirmed 
before those products may be imported into Japan.IID The United States challenged the 
varietal testing requirement as applied to eight products (apples, cherries, nectarines, 
walnuts, apricots, pears, plums, and quince) as violative of the SPS Agreement. 111 The 
United States claimed that the testing-by-variety (versus a testing-by-product) require-
ment lacked a scientific justification. Japan countered that having established that the 
products in question are host plants of codling moth, Japan was justified in taking a 
precautionary approach and, therefore, that its varietal testing requirement was war-
ranted under the precautionary principle. 1I2 
While conceding that Japan could apply a standard that was stricter than an in-
ternational standard, the Appellate Body noted that Japan was free to do so only if 
there was a scientific justification for such an SPS measure. According to the Appel-
late Body, "there is a 'scientific justification' for an SPS measure ... if there is a 
rational relationship between the SPS measure at issue and the available scientific 
information."113 The Appellate Body concluded that the varietal testing requirement 
as applied to apples, cherries, nectarines, and walnuts lacked sufficient scientific evi-
dence. 114 The Appellate Body added in connection with Japan's reliance on the pre-
cautionary principle that the precautionary principle, while reflected in the preamble, 
Article 3.3, and Article 5.7 ofthe SPS Agreement, was not written into the SPS Agree-
ment as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent with the 
specific obligations of WTO members under the Agreement. liS 
If'" See id. ~ 125. 
110 See Report of the WTO Panel, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R, ~~ 
2.18-2.22 (Oct. 27, 1998). 
II I See id. ~~ 4.16-4.24. 
112 See id. ~~ 4.25-4.34. 
113 Report of the Appellate Body, Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, AB-1998-8, WTIDS76/ABI 
R, at 21, ,,79 (Feb. 22, 1999). 
II. See id. ~~ 81-85. 
"' See id. ~~ 81-82. 
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With regard to the varietal testing requirement for apricots, pears, plums, and 
quince, the Appellate Body struck down Japan's SPS measure on the ground that 
Japan had failed to conduct a risk assessment as required under Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement. A risk assessment must: 1) identify the diseases to be prevented; 2) evalu-
ate the likelihood of entry of such diseases; and 3) evaluate the likelihood of entry 
according to the SPS measures that might be applied.111> Because Japan's 1996 risk 
assessment did not take into account the third factor, i.e., what alternative SPS mea-
sures might be applied, the Appellate Body invalidated the varietal testing require-
ment in connection with apricots, plums, pears, and quince. 
V. WHAT ARE THE BROAD LESSONS OF THESE WTO DECISIONS? 
Although the burden of proof of a violation of the SPS Agreement rests with the 
complaining WTO member, WTO jurisprudence to date shows that that burden is a 
relatively low barrier to clear. This is not a surprising result: the WTO is first and 
foremost the premier international organization for the enforcement of rules designed 
to promote open trade, and only incidentally an institution that enforces SPS stan-
dards. 
Why have responding countries been uniformly unsuccessful in WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings? While the pro-trade bias of the WTO might explain this re-
sult in part, the ultimate outcome of SPS disputes brought to the WTO are not a 
foregone conclusion. The Appellate Body jurisprudence teaches at least five valuable 
lessons for future respondents: 
The WTO's own "precautionary principle" seems to be, "If in doubt, trade wins 
out." The burden of proof certainly favors the exporting WTO member and, con-
sequently, trade. 
• Be active in the international standards-setting process. To the extent that im-
porting countries' SPS measures are a barrier to trade with an insufficient basis 
in science, then international standards can act as a sword to cut down such 
measures. 
• Use (or do not use) international standards, but be clear on the consequences. In 
the absence of a genuine SPS emergency, e.g., mad cow disease or the introduc-
tion of tainted food, if an importing country elects not to use a rclevant interna-
tional standard, it must be exhaustively thorough in the preparation of SPS mea-
sures that are not based on and that do not conform to international standards. An 
importing country that adopts its own SPS standards must do so on the basis of 
"sufficient scientific evidence" (whatever the term "sufficient" means). 
• Conduct a proper risk assessment. A proper risk assessment must identify the 
diseases whose entry or spread the member wants to prevent, evaluate the prob-
ability of entry of a pest or disease, not just the possibility of such entry, and 
evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases accord-
ing to the SPS measures which might be applied. Do not merely make some 
evaluation of the likelihood of entry or spread of a disease or pest; rather, estab-
lish a likelihood that a pest or disease will enter or be spread in the absence of the 
SPS measure. In the Australia Salmon decision, for example, Australia's ban on 
the importation of fresh salmon could not be justified on the basis of a risk assess-
ment that considered only the possibility of entry of disease. Likewise, in the 
116 See id. ~~ 112-114. 
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Japan Food Quarantine decision, Japan's SPS measure violated the SPS Agree-
ment because its risk assessment did not take into account what alternative SPS 
measures might be applied. 
Reliance on the precautionary principle is misplaced. Although the precaution-
ary principle is reflected in Articles 5.7 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, it only can 
be invoked when scientific evidence is "insufficient." As the EC Beef Hormone 
decision illustrates, all the available scientific evidence pointed to the conclusion 
that the hormones in dispute are safe when used in conformity with good prac-
tice. The precautionary principle does not override the express provisions of Ar-
ticles 2 and 5 of the SPS Agreement requiring that SPS measures be based on 
scientific evidence and a risk asscssmcnt. 1I7 
Moving forward, two conclusions are clear. First, a strategy for any importing 
country to pursue is to leverage international standards-setting bodies for the adoption 
of international standards that meet a country's SPS standards. Under the SPS Agrec-
ment, an international standard presumptively is valid, thereby placing a heavy bur-
den of proof on a complaining WTO member. Having made that suggestion, however, 
the reality is that leveraging international standards-setting bodies is problematic for 
developing countries because they lack the scientific expertise and resources to influ-
ence the debate. The commitment that developed countries made in Article 10.4 of the 
SPS Agreement to encourage and facilitate the participation of developing countries 
. in the international standards-setting organizations seems to have turned out to be 
hollow. Coalition building with developed countries perhaps offers a better alternative 
strategy for influencing the debate. In that connection, the Cairns Group, named after 
a 1986 meeting held in Cairns, Australia, represents sixteen agricultural exporting na-
tions from developed and dcvcloping countries which support liberalization of agricul-
tural trade. I 1M Given their common goal, this coalition of developing and developed 
countries should become more active in the international standards-setting process. 119 
Second, the precautionary principle is not a viable defense in a WTO dispute 
settlement proceeding. A number of environmental groups and the EU have advo-
cated amending the SPS Agreement to permit reliance on the precautionary prin-
ciple. 120 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body, although somewhat delphic in its pronounce-
ments on this score, has signaled that the SPS Agreement will have to be amended if 
WTO members want to raise the precautionary principle as a legal defense in WTO 
dispute settlement. 
VI. WHAT ARE THE SPECIFIC LESSONS OF THESE WTO DECISIONS 
FOR THE GMO CONTROVERSY? 
What insight do these three WTO decisions give to the current international con-
troversy over GMOs? To the extent that relevant scientific evidence is insufficient to 
show that GMOs are safe to humans, animals, and plants, importing countries may on 
117 See Kirwin, supra note 99. 
11M The Cairns Group members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala 
joined the Cairns Group as observers in 1999. 
119 See. e.g.. Gary G. Yerkey, Cairns Group Still Undecided on How to Approach Biotech Issue in WTO 
Talks, 16 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1646 (1999). 
120 See Gary G. Yerkey, Environmental Groups Urge WTO to AI/ow Import Bans Based on 'Precaution-
ary'Rule, 16 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), at 877 (1999). 
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a temporary basis exclude such products after conducting a risk assessment (i.e., an 
evaluation that GMOs are a potential source of adverse effects on human or animal 
health). There currently exists some scientific evidence which indicates that certain 
GMOs pose just such a threat to animal Iife. 121 At the same time, other genetically 
modified (GM) products appear to pose no health risk.122 
What importing countries do with this science is the next question. If they impose 
an import ban, it will be up to the United States and Canada, the chief advocates of 
GMOs, to collect sufficient scientific evidence to show that exported products con-
taining GMOs are safe.123 If they are unable to do so, then under the Article 5.7 pre-
cautionary principle importing countries may exclude their importation, provided they 
continue to gather additional information necessary for a more objective assessment 
of risk within a reasonable period of time. 
As of November 1999, the United States and the EU were discussing the creation 
of an ad hoc scientific panel to resolve GMO issues. 124 Biotech companies also had 
extended an olive branch, offering, inter alia, to label all GM products through all 
processing stages. 125 American farmers, however, do not want U.S.-EU negotiations 
to drag on indefinitely.126 Japan has proposed the creation of a forum in connection 
with the WTO agricultural negotiations set to begin January I, 2000 to address the 
issue of GMOS.127 The United States has urged WTO members to participate in the 
work of Codex to advance agreement on relevant international standards for GMOS.128 
Interestingly, the United States has not engaged in any WTO dispute settlement panel 
"saber rattling" over the GMO issue. Bearing in mind that the United States has not 
been hesitant about using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to resolve trade 
disputes that some observers have considered trivial, its hesitancy in calling for the 
creation of a WTO panel suggests that there is insufficient clarity in the SPS Agree-
ment to ensure a U.S. victory.129 
In connection with proposed EU regulations requiring that all products contain-
ing GMOs be labeled for the benefit of consumers, the United States has objected that 
121 See Toshio Aritake, Japan Enacts Labeling Standards for Processed Agricultural Products, 16 In!'1 
Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1216 (1999)("[ A 1 Cornell University researchers study, published May 20 in Nature, .. 
. said as many as 44 percent of butterfly larvae used in their experiment died four days after consuming leaves 
sprinkled with the pollen ofGMO com"); EC Freezes Approval ofU.S. GMO Seed. supra note I. 
122 See EU Scientists OK Food Products Derivedfrom Genetically Modified Corn Seeds, 161n!,1 Trade 
Rep. (BNA), at 1660 (1999). 
123 See Canadian Minister Dismisses Allegations That Genetically Modified Foods Are Unsafe, 16 In!'1 
Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1762 (1999); u.s., Canada Lodge Complaints Over Rapid Rise ill Genetic Labeling 
Measures, 161n!,1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1006 (1999). 
124 See Mark Felsenthal & Corbett B. Daly, Clinton, Prodi Vow to Ease WTO Differences. Create Tempo-
rary Scientific Panel on GMOs, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1776 (1999); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU to 
Begin Talks Aimed at Settling Row Over EU Ban on GMO Imports, 16 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1862 
(\ 999). 
12' See Biotech Companies Propose to EU Measures Aimed at Fears ofGMO Products, 16 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA), at 1775 (1999). 
126 See Gary G. Yerkey, Farm Leader Urges U.S. to Establish Six-Month Deadlinefor Biotech Pact with 
EU, 16 In!'1 Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1904 (1999). 
127 See Preparation for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, Proposal of Japan on Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs), WT/GC/w/365 (Oct. 12, 1999). 
128 See COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, Genetically Modified Agricultural and Food Prod-
ucts, Submissionfrom the United States, GITBT/w/115 (June 17, 1999). 
129 See Yerkey, supra note 126 ("lsi Siddiqui, special assistant to the secretary of agriculture for interna-
tional affairs, ... said that if the U.S.-EU discussions were to fail, the United States would be prepared to seek 
clarification of existing WTO rules to ensure that national import approval procedures for bioengineered prod-
ucts were transparent, science-based, and predictable."). See also Yerkey, supra note 124 ("Senior U.S. officials 
said ... that the United States was prepared to bring the issue into the WTO negotiating process ifit cannot be 
settled on a bilateral basis. "). 
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unless such labeling requirements are science-based, they are invalid under either the 
. SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement. l3o Yet even as the United States objects to 
GMO labeling requirements proposed by its trading partners, a bill entitled, "Geneti-
cally Engineered Food Right to Know Act," was being introduced in Congress in 
November 1999. 131 Also, it is ironic that environmental groups are among the most 
vocal opponents ofGMOs when it is indisputable that the cultivation ofGM crops has 
direct and substantial benefits for the environment. 132 GM com and soybeans, for 
example, are designed to be drought, disease, weed, and pest resistant, meaning that 
fewer chemical pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides have to be used to control pests, 
diseases, and weeds, and less water has to be used to irrigate GM cropS.133 
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS: SHOULD THE SPS AGREEMENT, OR OTHER WTO 
AGREEMENTS, BE AMENDED? 
As the 135-member WTO launches its latest round of multilateral trade negotia-
tions, the SPS Agreement undoubtedly will be on the agenda. An immediate first step 
should be the call for a standstill on all SPS disputes pending completion of the nego-
tiations. In the course of the negotiations, countries will have the opportunity to air 
concerns over SPS measures that block market access. Many of these measures pre-
date the SPS Agreement, which was the case with the three previously discussed dis-
putes. These SPS measures need to be revisited in an atmosphere that is less charged 
than the WTO dispute settlement process. 
Beyond a cease-fire/moratorium on WTO complaints, a nonexhaustive list of 
possible reforms include the following proposals: 
Risk analysis has three components: risk assessment (addressed in the SPS Agree-
ment), risk management, and risk communication. The role of risk communica-
tion needs to be elaborated on, especially in connection with labeling of products 
to address consumer concerns about the safety of products. 
The WTO has an image problem. Many groups view the WTO as secretive and 
closed. Meaningfully increasing the role of non-governmental organizations and 
civil society in the discussions will improve the WTO's legitimacy, increase trust, 
and polish its tarnished image. 
The ability of developing countries to participate in the process needs improve-
ment. If and when a developing country is put into the WTO docket for allegedly 
violating the SPS Agreement, it will be burdened economically in meeting the 
scientific arguments that are an inherent part of such disputes. Article 11.2 of the 
SPS Agreement dealing with the appointment of experts should be amended by 
making the appointment of expert advisory panels mandatory, making such ex-
pert panels exclusive, and providing that they be paid out of the WTO's budget. A 
c10scly related issue is the provision of technical assistance to developing coun-
130 Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade provides in part: 
technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objec-
tive .... Such legitimate objectives are, illter alia: ... protection of human health or safety, animal 
or plant life or health, or the environment. 
TBT Agreement art. 2.2. 
131 See Bill Seeking Labeling. More Research on Genetically Altered Foods Expected Soon, 16 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1877 (1999); H.R. 3377 I 06th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999). The bill was referred to the House 
Committee on Agriculture on Nov. 16, 1999. 
1.12 See A Testing Timefor Gelletically Altered Foods, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 17, 1999, at 4. 
113 See id. 
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tries, a commitment that developed countries made in Article 9 of the SPS Agree-
ment, which needs to be redoubled. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding should be amended to provide for fee 
shifting, so that the loser pays the winner's attorneys' fees and related costs of 
prosecuting or defending a WTO complaint. The expense alonc of bringing a WTO 
complaint can deter a developing country from bringing an otherwise meritorious 
complaint against a developed country. This cost also can be used as an instrument 
of harassment of developing countries by developed countries. Alternatively, the 
WTO should create the equivalent of a legal aid attorney (or public defender) to 
represent developing countries in WTO disputes. This reform could have the salu-
tary effect of reducing the WTO dispute settlement case load across the board. 
The SPS Agreement should be amended to clarify the status of multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements vis-a-vis the SPS Agreement, namely, in the event of a 
conflict, which prevails? For example, Article 104 of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides that in the event of an inconsistency be-
tween NAFTA and one of three multilateral environmental agreements (the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species, the Basel Convention on 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, and the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer), the latter prevails. 
• The SPS Agreement should be expanded to include animal welfare issues. For 
instance, the EU ban on the hormone bovine somatotropin, which enhances milk 
production· in dairy cows on October 26, 1999, on the ground that such a ban 
promotes animal health and weIfare. 134 
A precautionary principle based on clear guidelines should be included in the 
SPS Agreement. 135 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
On January 29, 2000, 130 countries concluded a biosafety protocol to the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity. 136 Under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,137 gov-
ernments have the right to block imports of certain GMOs if there is a reasonable 
doubt whether they could endanger public health or the environment. The Miami 
Group of the major GMO-producing nations-Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
the United States, and Uruguay-compromised on this precautionary principle lan-
guage by agreeing to the inclusion of the word "health" in the principle. Under Article 
10 of the Protocol, an importing country may reject GM imports despite the "lack of 
scientific certainty ... regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living 
modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity."138 
At the same time, however, Article 15 provides that an importing country "shall en-
sure that risk assessments are carried out in a scientifically sound manner" in decid-
ing whether to permit the transboundary movement of a living modified organism. 139 
1." See Joe Kirwin, EU Proposes Permanent Ban on BST; Expected to Heighten Tensions with U.S., 16 
Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1778 (1999). 
135 See Gary G. Yerkey, EU Set to Unveil Plan to Defuse Dispute with U.s. Over "Precautionary Prin-
ciple," 16 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), at 1774 (1999). 
1.1(, See Roland Blassnig & Gary G. Yerkey, Countries Agree on Biosafety Protocol Regulating 
Transboundary Movemcntl!f'GMOs, 17 Int'I Trade Rep. (BNA), at 187 (2000); Ruth Walker, Global Pact on 
GMOs Approl'ed, CflRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 31,2000, at 6. 
137 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000. The text of 
the Protocol is available at <www.biodiv.org> (last visited Feb. 2000). 
1.1< See id. art. 10. 
1)9 See id. art. 15. 
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What is the relationship of the Proto eo I to the SPS Agreement? What will be the 
Protocol's impaet, if any, on WTO dispute resolution under the SPS Agreement? The 
short answer is quite likely "none." The preamble to the Protocol underscores that the 
Protocol "shall not be interpreted" as changing the rights and obligations of countries 
under other international agreements. 140 The preamble states further that trade agree-
ments and international environmental agreements should be mutually supportive. '41 
U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky has stated that the Protocol preserves 
the rights of countries under other international agreements, such as the SPS Agree-
ment, thereby ensuring that the Protocol is not misused for proteetionist purposes.1 42 
The Protocol's impact is further muted by its limited scope: GMOs intended for food, 
feed, and processing (i.e., commodities) are exempted from the export-approval pro-
cess established under the Protocol. 143 
The Protocol will not take effect until fifty eountries have ratified it. Entry into 
force is not expected before the end of 200 I .144 
140 See id. Preamble. 
141 See id. 
142 See Blassnig & Yerkey, supra note 136. at 187. 
143 See id. The Protocol this covers items such as trees and seeds. 
144 See id. 
